The report examines the objectives, tools, and effectiveness of Russian information warfare conducted in the Middle East. The Kremlin treats information as a weapon and as a core component of a broader cognitive war against the West—aimed at disorienting public opinion, weakening trust in democratic institutions, and generating support for Russia’s actions. These operations take place below the threshold of conventional military aggression, remaining cheap, low-risk, and difficult to attribute conclusively.
Politically, the Middle East is not a top strategic priority for Russia, yet it serves as an important arena for contesting U.S. influence and for reinforcing Moscow’s global posture. Russia exploits regional conflicts—such as the war in Syria, the escalation in Gaza, or the Saudi–Iranian rivalry—to present itself as a stable, reliable partner and an alternative to the “disloyal” West. After the collapse of the Assad regime and the weakening of its own position in Syria, the Kremlin has sought to recalibrate its regional policy and retain access to key bases in Khmeimim and Tartus, while simultaneously continuing intensive information operations.
At the heart of Russia’s strategy in the Middle East lies the media ecosystem of RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic, which operate in the region without restrictions and whose content is redistributed by hundreds of local outlets. The Kremlin employs techniques characteristic of cognitive warfare: emotional manipulation, polarization, intimidation, false symmetry, whataboutism, recycling of narratives, and the use of ostensibly “independent” Western experts. Russia cultivates an image of itself as a “civilizational state,” a defender of conservative values, an ally of Muslims, and a counterweight to the West. Its messaging relies heavily on false analogies (e.g., “Ukrainians as the new Palestinians”) and conspiracy theories, including claims about U.S. biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine or alleged Ukrainian cooperation with ISIS.
Across media examples from the region, Russia frequently amplifies Western “realists” (e.g., John Mearsheimer, Scott Ritter) who legitimize narratives about the inevitable defeat of Ukraine and the decline of the West. Pro-Kremlin messaging is further circulated by influencer-style accounts, including fake profiles of supposed “diplomats” posting in Arabic. The Kremlin has also crafted an image of Vladimir Putin as a defender of the Qur’an, a theme that was widely amplified in Arab media following incidents of Qur’an burning in Europe.
The report concludes that Russian information operations in the Middle East are effective due to long-standing media presence, the region’s receptiveness to anti-Western narratives, and Russia’s targeted exploitation of political grievances, identity, religion, and emotion. At the same time, these operations constitute an integral element of the Kremlin’s broader cognitive war waged against the West, Ukraine, and states supporting the liberal international order.
