


## Analysis

# How Does the Global South Perceive Poland?

**Part III. The Image  
of Poland Shaped  
by Russian Media  
in 2025 in Turkish,  
Arabic, and Persian**



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# About the project



Instytut Badań  
nad Turcją



Disinformation  
in MENAT



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# Introduction


Previous analyses examined how Russia conducts disinformation operations in the MENAT region (Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey). Part I focused on the tools and techniques used to disseminate disinformation, while Part II analysed how Poland was portrayed in Russian Turkish-, Arabic-, and Persian-language media in 2023–2024. The present report looks at content published by Sputnik Türkiye, Sputnik Irān, and Sputnik ‘Arabī between 1 December 2024 and 2 November 2025 to see whether the narrative patterns identified earlier continued or changed over the past year.

Russian Disinformation in the MENAT Region.  
Analysis part 1.



How Does the Global South Perceive Poland?  
Analysis part 2.

As part of the previous publication, entries published on Sputnik portals in 2023–2024 containing the word “Poland” (Polonya, بولندا, لهستان) were analysed. References to Poland appeared most frequently in Persian (1,076 occurrences), slightly less often in Turkish (1,071), and least in Arabic (845). In Turkish- and Arabic-language content, more entries were recorded in 2023, while in Persian, the higher number was in 2024. In 2025, the term “Poland” appeared 304 times in Turkish, 337 times in Arabic, and 321 times in Persian; in November alone, the respective figures were 25, 28, and 7.



**Graphic 1.** How often did “Poland” appear in the search results? Based on the author’s dataset.

However, this does not imply that the referenced texts were entirely focused on issues related to Poland. In most cases, Poland is only mentioned in the context of the war in Ukraine, great-power rivalry, or broader global affairs. It is nevertheless notable that the number of references to Poland in Arabic has increased; for the first time, this language version contains the highest number of such entries. Simultaneously, when the figures over the three consecutive years are combined, a significant rise in the number of Persian-language articles becomes evident.

# Chapter 1.

## Contexts in Which Narratives About Poland Appear

As in previous years, texts published by Sputnik vary across different language versions, and various techniques of textual manipulation are used. In some cases, they contain outright disinformation; in others, they rely more on manipulation, selective framing, or removing quotations from their original context. At the same time, the portal consistently quotes statements by politicians and journalists that are intended to lend credibility to the Russian narrative. Frequently, these statements lack the broader context necessary to understand the true meaning of the words being quoted.

Some topics—such as

- violations of Polish airspace by Russian drones,
- historical threads related to the Second World War,
- the attempted sabotage of railway tracks in Poland—have already been discussed in greater detail in other reports published on the website: <https://disinfoinmenat.com/en/>



Sabotage on Polish Railways in the Turkish Infosphere: An Analysis of Narratives and Disinformation



How Iranian Media Interpreted  
Russia's Violation of Polish Airspace



History as a Tool of Influence: Russian Narratives about World War II in Sputnik Türkiye, Sputnik Arabic, and Sputnik Iran



Aggression or Provocation? An Analysis of Arab Media Coverage Following the Incident Involving Russian Drones over Poland in September 2025



‘Unprecedented’ Violation and ‘Alleged’ Evidence:  
An Analysis of Narrative Lines in Türkiye Following  
the Drone Attack on Poland

## 1.1. Sputnik Türkiye

Sputnik Türkiye consistently depicts Poland as an aggressive, Russophobic country that destabilises the region, relying on a series of repetitive disinformation tactics. These include accusing Poland of territorial ambitions towards Ukraine; claiming that Warsaw escalates the conflict and undermines peace negotiations; suggesting that Polish elites support acts of terrorism against energy infrastructure; emphasising alleged historical animosity towards Russians and Ukrainians; and exploiting the Volhynia massacre to foster anti-Ukrainian sentiment. These narratives rely on quoting Russian politicians and marginal foreign commentators, manipulating the context of statements, and presenting unverified “evidence” as established fact. In doing so, Sputnik Türkiye constructs a consistent image of Poland as an extreme, irresponsible, and inherently anti-Russian actor whose actions supposedly threaten European stability, Turkey’s interests, and ongoing peace efforts.

### Poland as an Aggressor

- Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán accused Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk of provoking the war in Ukraine and fully subordinating himself to the West[1];
- Russian MFA spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that former German Chancellor Angela Merkel had allegedly confirmed the “devastating” role of Poland and the Baltic states in EU and NATO policy prior to the Russian invasion. She also cited Sergey Lavrov, who described Poland and the Baltic countries as “destructive moles” within the EU, serving Anglo-Saxon interests and acting against the Union’s priorities[2];
- The portal L’Antidiplomatico — citing materials allegedly obtained from hackers — argued that the plans of the “Coalition of the Willing” were not intended to protect Ukraine but to pave the way for its division between France, the United Kingdom, Romania, and Poland[3];
- Sputnik’s narrative suggests that Tusk, Macron, and other Western politicians are “fuelling the flames of the conflict” and sabotaging Turkish-led negotiations in Istanbul by invoking the “Russian threat”[4];
- Journalist Ali Çağatay, speaking on Radio Sputnik, argued that the EU imposed high tariffs on Ukrainian goods at Poland’s request because Poland — portrayed as the “EU’s farm” — fears competition. According to him, Poland was also the main opponent of Turkey’s EU accession, claiming that Turkey’s entry would deprive Poland of its current standing and efficiency[5];
- Sputnik reports also include a narrative about Polish mercenaries allegedly participating in supposed massacres of civilians in the city of Selydove in the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic[6];
- Russian intelligence chief Sergey Naryshkin claimed that Poland allegedly plans to reclaim its “historic lands” in Ukraine, including Lviv[7].

[1] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20251101/orban-tusk-polonyayi-brukselin-vasalina-donusturdu-1100676337.html>

[2] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20251008/zaharova-merkel-polonyanin-ab-ve-nato-politikalarindaki-yikici-rolunu-dogruladi-1100032205.html>

[3] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20250911/istekliler-koalisyonunun-ukrayna-konusundaki-gizli-planl-basina-sizdi-1099302006.html>

[4] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20250726/rus-vekil-slutskiy-batili-rus-dusmanlari-istanbuldaki-gorusmeleri-bozmaya-calisiyor-1098164630.html>

[5] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20250515/1096236496.html>

[6] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20250128/abd-ve-avrupa-ulkeleri-donbasta-ukraynalilarin-eliyle-savas-sucu-isliyor-1093145470.html>

[7] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20250213/rusya-dis-istihbarat-servisi-polonya-lvivi-ukraynadan-geri-almanin-pesinde-1093641780.html>

## Poland Supports Acts of Terrorism

- British commentator George Szamuely suggested that the explosions at refineries in Hungary and Romania may be part of a sabotage campaign targeting Russian energy supplies. He implied links to Poland by referencing the release of suspects in the Nord Stream case and statements made by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs[8];
- Maria Zakharova accused Radosław Sikorski of “supporting terrorism,” claiming that he had expressed hope for blowing up the Druzhba pipeline and calling him “Osama bin Sikorski”[9];
- Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Poland “is ready to carry out terrorist acts,” commenting on an incident involving an alleged threat to President Putin’s aircraft[10].

## Poland’s Russophobia

- Russian senator Alexey Pushkov stated that the “anti-Russian character of the Polish elite” allegedly leads the nation towards tragedy[11];
- Maria Zakharova claimed that the declaration of the Three Seas Initiative summit contained “clear Russophobic elements,” arguing that any project bypassing Russia is “artificial and pointless”[12];
- Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Poland of spreading unfounded allegations about supposed Russian plans to attack air routes, emphasising that Warsaw “seeks to be the leader in making accusations”[13];

## The Volhynia Massacre

- President of Poland Karol Nawrocki stated: “In Ukraine, we know that even within the public education system the symbols of Bandera are not defined in accordance with historical research. They were murderers and depraved people responsible for the deaths of about 120,000 of our citizens and ancestors”[14];
- The Federal Security Service published archival materials concerning UPA crimes against Poles while simultaneously accusing the Home Army (under the London-based Polish government-in-exile) of conducting bloody terrorist attacks against Ukrainian civilians in western Ukraine to ‘cleanse’ territories that Polish nationalists purportedly intended to seize[15];
- Journalist Chay Bowes[16] claimed that Poles “perceive Ukrainians as Nazis,” demanding that then-President Andrzej Duda explain why, under such circumstances, he supplied them with weapons[17].

[8] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20251023/macaristandaki-petrol-rafinesi-patlamalariyla-ilgili-konusan-dr-szamuely-tesaduf-gibi-gorunuyor-ama-1100423641.html>

[9] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20251022/zaharovadan-petrol-boru-hattinin-havaya-ucurulmasi-tesvigne-tepki-usame-bin-sikorskiy-1100400974.html>

[10] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20251021/lavrov-ateskes-ukraynanin-buyuk-kismini-nazilere-birakmak-demek-1100359738.html>

[11] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20251028/puskov-tusk-surekli-ulkeleri-savasa-cekmeye-calisiyor-ancak-boyle-bir-savasin-kacinilmaz-kurbani-1100528608.html>

[12] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20250506/zaharova-uc-deniz-girisimi-umut-vaat-etmiyor-1095990116.html>

[13] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20250116/kremlinden-polonyanin-rusya-saldiri-hazirligi-yapiyor-iddiasina-yanit-tamamen-delilsiz-suclama-1092750108.html>

[14] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20250813/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrocki-ukrayna-egitim-sisteminde-bandera-sembollerini-yanlis-tanitiliyor-1098577686.html>

[15] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20250710/aralarinda-6-kadin-ve-5-cocuk-en-az-19-polonyaliyi-bizzat-oldurdu-1097765464.html>

[16] Chay Bowes is an Irish entrepreneur, journalist, and internet personality. He co-founded the website The Ditch. His writings, primarily published on Twitter, adopt a pro-Russian and anti-Western stance.

[17] <https://anlatilaninotesi.com.tr/20250531/polonyali-gazeteci-dudanin-ukraynali-nazilere-neden-silah-verdigini-aciklamasi-gerekliyor-1096675561.html>

## Summary

Compared to the narratives from 2023–2024, this year's content on Sputnik Türkiye retains the core elements of Russian disinformation about Poland — continuing to portray it as an aggressor, a state with imperial ambitions, and a key actor responsible for escalating the war in Ukraine. However, notable shifts in emphasis and several extensions of earlier motifs are evident. A consistent feature remains the obsessive highlighting of alleged Polish territorial plans towards Ukraine and Belarus, attributing “selfish ambitions” to Polish elites, and systematically using statements by Russian and Belarusian politicians to lend a veneer of credibility to these claims. The narrative surrounding “Polish mercenaries” has also evolved: previously focused mainly on the presence of foreign volunteers, it has now expanded into allegations of massacres, rape, and war crimes. A significant difference is the broadening of narrative themes. New content more directly links Poland to terrorism (alleged support for attacks on critical infrastructure), internal EU disputes (portraying Poland as an extreme, anti-EU actor), and the destabilisation of European airspace. Unlike in 2023–2024, when the focus centred primarily on the annexation of “eastern territories” and militarisation, this year's messages are more aggressive, emotionally charged, and more closely tied to current events (e.g., railway incidents, drone activities, and sabotage targeting energy infrastructure).

### 1.2. Sputnik Irān

Articles on Sputnik Irān are generally quite brief and often lack visual materials. Many focus on highly niche topics, such as footage of deer during the rutting season in Poland, or reports that during fire brigade exercises in Ruda near Włocławek, a burning garbage truck unexpectedly entered the training area after being ignited by a crushed power bank[18]. A significant number of articles mention Poland only in relation to the war in Ukraine or internal political developments in Kyiv. This shows that the large number of articles does not necessarily reflect their real importance. Several texts are also notably less serious, including reports suggesting that Polish President Karol Nawrocki supposedly consults almost daily with the spirit of Józef Piłsudski[19]. Some pieces are simply reposted news items from Telegram.

A few texts are accompanied by basic graphics, usually in the form of screenshots or embedded social media posts:



آیا کسی در این کشور عقلش را از دست داده است؟ - سیاستمدار لهستانی

(02.11.2025 21:40) (بروز رسانی شده: 02.11.2025 21:33)

Piotr Grzegorz Płachetka  
وزیر اقتصاد و امور خارجه لهستان

Odpowiadając kolejno pytaniom zawiadomienia o interwencji polskiej: 2025/W/H/09  
w sprawie pomyślnego dla Ukrainy informacji, jak następuje:

1. Tak, Ukraina wystąpiła do Komisji Europejskiej z wnioskiem o ponoszenie w formie spłaty odsetek od pożyczonych środków ramach MFA.
2. W 2025 roku Polska dokonała spłaty swojej części zobowiązania do ponoszenia w formie spłaty odsetek od pożyczonych środków ramach MFA.

Komisja Europejska pozwoliła do ponoszenia połekiwanych kredytów wersję o pojętych wyrządzone w euro. W kwietniu br. opłacono transzy za pierwszy kwartał 2025 r. w wysokości 125.240.822,6 PLN, w tym poniesiono spłaty odsetek od pożyczonych środków ramach MFA w wysokości 45.000,33 PLN, w pabieżniem opłacono transzy za trzeci kwartał 2025 r. w wysokości 283.724.46,82 PLN, ponownie transzy za pierwszy kwartał 2025 roku. Podlegały tym transzy, aby stworzyć 2025 r. Wysokość zobowiązań poza tym będzie zmniejszać się kolejno do połekiwania po zakończeniu

لایک تصویر

اشتراك



وزیر خارجه لهستان عملاً از رژیم کی یف  
خواست تا حملات تروریستی علیه خط لوله  
نفت "دروژبا" انجام دهد

(22.10.2025 18:40) (بروز رسانی شده: 22.10.2025 18:36)

slaw Sikorski  
@sikorskiradek · 5h  
ing to @FM\_Szijjarto and @donaldtusk

I am proud of the Polish court which ruled that sabotaging a pipeline is a crime.

Moreover, I hope your brave compatriot, Major Magyar, finally succeeds in blowing up the oil pipeline that feeds Putin's war machine and via Croatia.

لایک تصویر

اشتراك

[18] <https://spnfa.ir/20251014/25959863.html>

[19] <https://spnfa.ir/20250930/25701840.html>

## Poland as a Russophobic State Attempting to Undermine Relations with Russia

- Moscow interprets Poland's closure of the Russian consulate in Gdańsk as evidence of a policy aimed at damaging bilateral relations between the two countries[20];
- Sputnik references the alleged Polish magazine Myśl Polska, which accuses Polish politicians of "insane Russophobia"[21];
- Poland is portrayed as deliberately adopting hostility and rejecting any form of friendship towards Russia; the country is depicted as launching baseless accusations against Moscow, a stance characterised as fundamentally Russophobic[22].

## Poland as an Aggressor

- Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán criticised the "war policy" of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk regarding Ukraine[23];
- Following the Putin–Trump meeting in Alaska, many allegedly hoped for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. However, several European states — particularly the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland — were portrayed as doing everything possible to sabotage any potential agreement[24];
- Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia's Permanent Representative to International Organisations in Vienna, stated that Poland's declaration of being "unready" to hold consultations with the Russian Ministry of Defence regarding the recent drone incident seemed more like a provocation than a diplomatic stance[25];
- The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that this position results from "unjustified and hostile actions by the Polish side," which, according to Moscow, led to the reduction of Russia's consular presence in Poland under the "pretext of apparent reasons"[26].

## Poland Supporting Terrorism

- The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs is depicted as effectively urging the "Kyiv regime" to carry out terrorist attacks on the Druzhba oil pipeline[27];
- Lavrov claimed that threats from Poland directed at President Putin's aircraft demonstrate Warsaw's alleged willingness to commit terrorist acts[28];
- The Russian Investigative Committee reported that the organisers of an attempted attack on Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, head of the Russian Armed Forces' Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Protection Troops, allegedly smuggled explosive components from Poland disguised as household items, acting on the instructions of Ukrainian intelligence services[29].

[20] <https://spnfa.ir/20251120/26581825.html>

[21] <https://spnfa.ir/20251001/25717031.html>

[22] <https://spnfa.ir/20250512/22317484.html>

[23] <https://spnfa.ir/20251101/26279299.html>

[24] <https://spnfa.ir/20251017/26002227.html> آیا-ترامپ-در-مقابل-جنگ-طلبان-می-ایستد-ای.html

[25] <https://spnfa.ir/20250914/25372907.html>

[26] <https://spnfa.ir/20250711/23568025.html>

[27] <https://spnfa.ir/20251022/26100641.html>

[28] <https://spnfa.ir/20251021/26078755.html>

[29] <https://spnfa.ir/20251008/25846875.htm>

## Polish Services Conducting Sabotage and Attempting to Blame Russia

- A diversionary-reconnaissance group allegedly operating on Polish territory was described as comprising Russian and Belarusian special forces soldiers. After executing a sabotage operation and being “neutralised” by Polish security forces, its members supposedly appeared in media statements “confessing” that Russia and Belarus aimed to destabilise Poland[30];
- According to Russian intelligence, this “provocative scenario” was allegedly devised by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence in cooperation with Polish special services. It was suggested that the operation might include a simulated attack on critical infrastructure in Poland to incite greater public outrage[31];
- Security forces in the Nizhny Novgorod region reportedly dismantled a clandestine Islamist cell. The Russian Federal Security Service claimed that the network comprised seven citizens of a Central Asian state, who allegedly received instructions from an envoy from Poland and propagated terrorist ideology among local Muslims[32].

## The Volhynia Massacre

- Kyiv allegedly threatened the President of Poland after he proposed banning the use of Bandera symbols on Polish territory[33];
- President of Poland Karol Nawrocki stated in an interview with Polsat TV: “I am outraged by the presence of Bandera symbols in the public space in Poland, as well as in Ukraine itself — but that is a different country. Their presence in Polish public spaces is absolutely unacceptable”[34];
- The weekly Myśl Polska claims that Ukraine conceals the truth about the Volhynia massacre, committed by Ukrainian nationalists during the Second World War, fearing that disclosure would undermine Western support. The periodical sharply criticised the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for what it described as a “hypocritical” reaction to the proposal of establishing a new Polish national holiday to commemorate the victims of genocide, arguing that Ukraine’s ostensible concern for reconciliation is insincere. The massacre is attributed to Bandera supporters — Ukrainian Nazi collaborators allegedly glorified by the Zelensky government[35].

[31] [سرویس اطلاعات خارجی روسیه اعلام کرد که یک در حال آماده سازی بک اقدام تحریکی جدید علیه روسیه است--.html](https://spnfa.ir/20250930/25692724.html)

[31] [\[31\] https://spnfa.ir/20250930/25692691.html](https://spnfa.ir/20250930/25692691.html)

[32] [\[32\] https://spnfa.ir/20250526/22562201.html](https://spnfa.ir/20250526/22562201.html)

[33] [\[33\] https://spnfa.ir/20250825/24846660.html](https://spnfa.ir/20250825/24846660.html)

[34] [\[34\] https://spnfa.ir/20250813/24534674.html](https://spnfa.ir/20250813/24534674.html)

[35] [\[35\] https://spnfa.ir/20250610/22827073.html](https://spnfa.ir/20250610/22827073.html)

## Summary

Recent Sputnik Irān publications on Poland are brief, often lacking illustrations or accompanied by random, repetitive graphics. Many are marginal or anecdotal, reducing their informational value, while others simply repost content from Telegram. Nevertheless, several recurring propaganda narratives can be clearly identified. First, Poland is depicted as a Russophobic state deliberately undermining relations with Russia (e.g., consulate closures, accusations of “madness of Russophobia,” alleged hostility toward Moscow). Second, Poland is portrayed as an aggressor sabotaging diplomatic efforts to resolve the war in Ukraine and provoking Russia — for instance, through the alleged refusal to consult on drone incidents or Donald Tusk’s purportedly “escalatory” policies. Third, new content reinforces the narrative that Poland supports terrorism, either by “inciting” attacks on infrastructure (the Druzhba pipeline), threatening Putin’s aircraft, or allegedly being involved in smuggling explosives. The fourth narrative depicts Polish security services conducting sabotage and then trying to shift blame onto Russia and Belarus, while also suggesting alleged Polish links to Islamist groups in Russia. The final prominent theme is the instrumentalisation of the Volhynia massacre, used to portray Poland and Ukraine as historically antagonistic nations, thereby undermining Polish–Ukrainian solidarity and discrediting Warsaw’s support for Kyiv.

Overall, recent Sputnik Irān narratives largely continue patterns observed in 2023–2024, framing Poland as an aggressor, an implementer of U.S. interests, intent on occupying western Ukraine, and posing a threat to Belarus and Russia. However, the 2025 content is more aggressive, sensationalised, and more closely linked to current events. Themes related to terrorism are more prominent—such as Poland allegedly supporting attacks or threatening to shoot down Putin’s plane—alongside accusations of sabotage coordinated with Ukrainian services or links between Poland and Islamists in Russia. Whereas in 2023–2024 the emphasis was mainly on the “partition of Ukraine” narrative and U.S. control over Poland, current messaging stresses destructive sabotage, diplomatic provocations, and Poland’s alleged readiness to engage in terrorist acts. At the same time, the coverage of the Volhynia massacre — previously marginal in Persian-language reporting — has gained greater prominence, serving to undermine Polish–Ukrainian relations and weaken Poland’s regional credibility.

### 1.3. Sputnik Arabī

In the Arabic version of Sputnik, texts are notably longer and more detailed than in the Persian edition, although occasional Telegram dispatches also appear — a feature not observed in the Turkish version. Poland frequently appears in articles concerning Ukraine, but the Arabic-language coverage focuses particularly on the “liberation” of territories in Donbas and other separatist regions, repeatedly highlighting foreign mercenaries. Polish fighters are described as the second-largest contingent after Americans, and deceased personnel are allegedly mutilated by Ukrainian forces to prevent identification. References to the Volhynia massacre are minimal and limited to brief notes suggesting that disputes over exhumation and recognition hinder Ukraine’s EU accession; no in-depth coverage is provided. Additionally, only the Arabic edition reports on a Polish member of parliament participating in the “Freedom Flotilla”[36].

## Poland as an Aggressor

- Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán criticised Poland's policy in Ukraine[37];
- Dr Ali Baidoun, professor of political science and international relations in Beirut, claimed: "Poland was the cause of World War II, and it will again be the reason for World War III, which will bring no benefit to Europe and will lead to economic, security, and political collapse"[38].

## Poland Supporting Terrorism

- Sergey Lavrov on Donald Tusk: “**Every sensible person in Europe will be warned against forming such a close alliance with a country that tolerates terrorism and defends the right of other states to commit acts of terror**”[39];
- British commentator George Szamuely suggested that explosions at refineries in Hungary and Romania may be part of a sabotage campaign against Russian energy supplies, allegedly implicating Poland through the release of suspects in the Nord Stream case and statements by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs[40];
- A Polish priest was arrested in Belarus on charges of espionage[41];
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko reportedly thanked Belarusian customs officers for intercepting a large shipment of explosives allegedly travelling from Poland to Russia[42];

## Use of Statements by Poles Who Fled to Russia and Belarus

- Former Polish mercenary Krzysztof Flaczek, who joined Russian forces, likened Ukraine's compulsory military conscription to Nazi practices during the occupation of Poland, accusing Ukrainian recruitment centres of forcing citizens into combat[43];

## Anti-Refugee Sentiments in Poland

- Nabil al-Jubaili, director of the Middle East Observatory in Moscow, claimed that Ukrainian refugees in Poland face harassment: "Poland has been a racist country from the outset and seeks to remain 'pure' and free of refugees, whose presence is associated with rising crime and economic problems"[44];
- Dr Abdul Karim al-Wazzan, an Iraqi academic and political analyst, asserted that many Ukrainians in Poland are exposed to abuse on public transport, intimidation in schools, and xenophobic content online[45].

## Russophobia

- Relations between Russia and Poland have worsened significantly in recent years, with Moscow accusing Warsaw of increasing anti-Russian sentiment. Despite Russian criticism and protests, Polish authorities allegedly destroy Soviet monuments and confiscate Russian property. In response, Moscow reportedly added Poland to its list of "unfriendly countries"[46];
- Poland allegedly closed its border with Belarus because, despite bans, many Poles travel there to buy inexpensive goods, and the Polish government supposedly fears they may discover that Belarus does not operate under a "bloody tyranny"[47].

[36] <https://sarabic.ae/20251002/1105528816-ادخلي-الخطافه-عاجلة-من-البحر-نائب-بولندي-مشارك-في-أسطول-الصموed-يطلب-حكومة-بالتدخل-بعد-ادخلي-الخطافه.html>

[37] <https://sarabic.ae/20251101/1106635711.html> أوريان-رئيس-الوزراء-البولندي-يتصدر-دعاة-الحرب-في-أوروبا-1106635711.html

[\[38\] \*\*https://sarabic.ae/20250916/1104906268.html\*\*](https://sarabic.ae/20250916/1104906268.html)

<https://sarabic.ae/20251028/1106473269>

[\[40\] https://sarabic.ae/2025/10/23/110631295440](https://sarabic.ae/2025/10/23/110631295440) خبر-إجراءات-الاتحاد الأوروبي-يتبناها-الاتحاد الأوروبي-لـ-الإضرار-بالدول-الأعضاء--[40]

بوتين يشكّر لوكاشينكو: هافنيا على طرقها إلى روسيا-103.html

[43] <https://sarabic.ae/20250826/1104132955>

السلام - لأن زيلنسكي لا يستطيع حمايتم - إذا استمرت المغارك - ٤٤

[46] <https://sarabic.ae/20251023/11063129954.html>  
[47] <https://sarabic.ae/20250911/11047395573.html>

## Summary

The latest **Sputnik 'Arabī** content about Poland creates clear, recurring narratives. First, Poland is shown as an **aggressor and “instigator of wars,”** with examples from Viktor Orbán’s criticism of Donald Tusk’s “war policy” to Dr Ali Baidoun’s assertion that Poland caused the Second World War and might trigger a third. Second, the **portrayal of Poland supporting terrorism** is particularly notable. Third, the discourse includes “**repentant Poles**,” like former mercenary Flaczek, whose testimony is used to support Russian claims about “Nazi methods” of Ukrainian conscription. Another key theme concerns **anti-refugee and racist sentiments in Poland**, with regional experts describing the country as aiming to stay “pure and free of refugees,” and rife with violence and xenophobia towards Ukrainians. Lastly, the narrative of **Polish Russophobia** is reinforced through accounts of monument destruction, confiscation of Russian property, inclusion on the “unfriendly states” list, and allegations of border closures with Belarus.

Compared to the 2023–2024 **Sputnik 'Arabī** coverage—which mainly depicted **Poland as an aggressive, revisionist state** planning to occupy western Ukraine, as a tool of the United States and NATO, and as turning the region into a potential battleground—the latest content **retains these core themes but amplifies them**. Throughout both periods, familiar narratives emerge: alleged Polish territorial ambitions in Ukraine, portraying Poland as a “pawn” of Washington, destabilising the region, and highlighting supposed Polish–Ukrainian tensions. However, in the most recent texts, themes of **terrorism and sabotage** are significantly amplified, depicting Poland as organiser or supporter of attacks, a source of explosives, or a state “tolerating terrorism.” These are accompanied by **moral delegitimisation of Polish society**, portraying Poland as racist, anti-refugee, and violent towards Ukrainians—elements that were largely absent previously. While the 2023–2024 narratives focused on the “partition of Ukraine,” American strategic control over Poland, “Polish Guantánamo,” and the Nord Stream case, these motifs now coexist with new layers: allegations of Polish terrorism, espionage, “repentant” defectors, and systemic violence against refugees.

Overall, this creates a narrative trajectory where the traditional accusations of Polish aggression and revisionism evolve into an image of Poland as a **morally compromised, racist state sponsor of violence**—more radical, more emotional, and more closely connected to current events.

## Chapter 2.

# Analysis of Similarities and Differences Across Sputnik Türkiye, Sputnik Irān, and Sputnik ‘Arabī

Across all three language editions—Turkish, Persian, and Arabic—Sputnik presents **the same core narrative** about Poland. Poland is depicted as:

- **An aggressor and destabiliser in Central and Eastern Europe:** escalating the war, acting as a “war incubator,” seeking to annex western Ukraine, and threatening Belarus and Russia;
- **A Russophobic “pawn of the West”:** an instrument of U.S. and NATO policy, advancing anti-Russian initiatives within Euro-Atlantic organisations;
- **A state associated with terrorism and sabotage:** involved in Nord Stream, the Druzhba pipeline, alleged threats to Putin’s aircraft, and the smuggling of explosives;
- **A party in conflict with Ukraine:** with focus on Volhynia, disputes over Bandera symbols, tensions related to refugees, and alleged “war fatigue” within Polish society.

All versions rely on the same toolbox: excessive quoting of Russian officials, marginal “experts,” niche Polish media, and former Western military personnel, combined with selective framing and manipulation of context. Poland almost never appears as an autonomous actor; instead, it is embedded within narratives about Ukraine, the United States, or NATO.

### Differences Across Editions

**Sputnik Türkiye:** The messaging is the most overtly geopolitical. Poland is depicted as a competitor within the EU (“EU farm” blocking Turkey), an actor escalating the conflict, and a state undermining negotiations in Istanbul. Themes related to NATO, the Three Seas Initiative, energy politics, and Volhynia are prominent, resonating with Turkish audiences familiar with EU–NATO dynamics and debates about Turkey’s regional ambitions.

**Sputnik Irān:** This edition is both visually and substantively weaker: texts are brief, graphics are repetitive or flawed, and many posts feature anecdotal or trivial news (e.g., a burning rubbish truck or “Piłsudski’s ghost”), including numerous Telegram reposts. Despite this low quality of production, the underlying narratives remain sharp and hostile: Poland is depicted as a Russophobic aggressor engaged in sabotage, terrorism, and joint provocations with Ukraine. This aligns with Iranian sensitivities about Western hypocrisy, NATO’s supposed hostility, covert operations, and terrorism. Although the edition seems “cheaper,” its propagandistic core remains highly aggressive.

**Sputnik ‘Arabī:** The content in Arabic is the longest, most detailed, and thematically expansive. Alongside the traditional narratives (aggressor, annexationist ambitions, U.S. pawn), there is a strong focus on racism and anti-refugee sentiment in Poland, mistreatment of Ukrainians, and regionally significant cases (e.g., Freedom Flotilla, Gaza evacuation). These themes are adapted for Arab-speaking audiences who are sensitive to issues of Palestine, refugees, Western hypocrisy, and Islamophobia in Europe.

## Conclusions from the Three Parts of Analysis

Russian disinformation in Turkish, Arabic, and Persian constructs a coherent and consistent image of Poland: an aggressive, Russophobic state subordinated to the U.S. and NATO, destabilising Central and Eastern Europe, and escalating the war in Ukraine. Poland is rarely presented as an independent actor; instead, it is framed as a Western proxy allegedly willing to jeopardise regional security to pursue imperial ambitions (annexation of western Ukraine, threatening Belarus, acting as a “war incubator”). This narrative framework underpins every story about Poland—from drone incidents and sabotaged railways to EU and NATO policy debates.

In 2023–2024, the focus was mainly on Ukraine’s “partition,” alleged plans to annex Lviv and the “borderlands,” U.S. control over Warsaw, and Poland as NATO’s loudest “hawk.” In 2025, this core remains but with notable shifts: Poland is increasingly linked to terrorism, sabotage, and crime—allegedly behind attacks on energy infrastructure (Nord Stream, “Druzhba”), threatening to shoot down Putin’s plane, smuggling explosives, co-organizing provocations with Ukrainian services, and even inspiring Islamists in Russia. The moral layer is expanded: Poland is portrayed as racist, anti-refugee, brutal toward Ukrainians, and saturated with “mad Russophobia.” The narrative evolves from “geopolitical aggressor” to morally compromised, violence-sponsoring state.

Language editions tailor these narratives to resonate locally:

- **Turkish:** Poland as competitor and European order disruptor (“EU farm”), blocking EU enlargement, sabotaging Istanbul talks, pushing NATO toward confrontation with Russia.
- **Persian:** Short, sensational dispatches—Poland allegedly supporting terrorism, secret operations, provocations with Polish services and Islamists—mirroring familiar Iranian discourse on U.S., Israel, and Gulf operations.
- **Arabic:** Racism and anti-refugee sentiment are highlighted, along with mistreatment of Ukrainians and Middle Eastern contexts (Flotilla of Freedom, Gaza evacuation), portraying Poland as embodying Western hypocrisy and Islamophobia.

On the level of techniques, the Russian messaging aligns with broader analyses of Russian information warfare in the MENAT region. Across all language editions, selective quoting (“cherry-picking”) dominates, drawing on statements from Western politicians and marginal commentators—ranging from Viktor Orbán, through niche British pundits, to obscure Polish media—so as to present the material as either a “Western voice against Poland” or “Poles themselves admitting Russia is right.” Key methods include: extracting statements out of context, using suggestive headlines, and juxtaposing facts without clarifying causal relationships (e.g., linking Polish EU decisions to alleged sabotage plans). The content is repeated across multiple platforms—portals, radio, Telegram—and interspersed with trivial news items (burning garbage truck in Ruda, “Piłsudski’s spirit”), which normalizes the outlet and fosters the perception of a “regular” news service.

Another important tool is the “content laundering” carried out by local experts and regional media. Sputnik, in all three language editions, regularly features commentators from Turkey, Arab countries, or Iran who—speaking in their own idiom about Poland—repeat Russian narratives: that Poland caused World War II and now threatens to cause another, that it is “racist and ethnically pure,” and that its elites are driven by hatred toward Russia and Ukraine. This framing makes the message appear as “local opinion” rather than Moscow-imposed propaganda. Additionally, difficult historical topics—particularly the Volhynia massacre—are instrumentalized to undermine, in the eyes of Global South audiences, the credibility of Poland’s support for Ukraine and to portray the two nations as inherently prone to conflict.