Russian disinformation in the Middle East and North Africa (the MENAT region) should not be understood as a side effect of Moscow’s foreign policy, nor as an isolated propaganda effort aimed exclusively at local audiences. Instead, it constitutes a central component of Russia’s broader cognitive and information warfare strategy against the West.
For the Kremlin, the Middle East is not primarily a military priority, but a strategic narrative battlefield. It offers a unique combination of political fragmentation, historical grievances toward Western powers, unresolved conflicts, and highly polarized media ecosystems. These conditions create an environment in which Russian narratives do not need to dominate outright — they merely need to undermine Western credibility, introduce doubt, and normalize ambiguity.
Rather than promoting an explicitly pro-Russian worldview, Moscow’s information strategy in the region focuses on eroding trust in Western actors, relativizing responsibility for international conflicts, and reshaping how global power dynamics are perceived.
Russia’s approach to the MENAT region reflects a broader shift in its understanding of conflict. Modern warfare, from Moscow’s perspective, is no longer confined to kinetic operations. Instead, it increasingly unfolds in the cognitive domain, where perceptions, emotions, and interpretations shape political outcomes.
The Middle East plays a crucial role in this strategy for several reasons:
In this context, Russia’s goal is not to “win hearts and minds” in a traditional sense. Instead, it aims to weaken moral clarity, dilute Western narratives, and present global politics as a struggle between equally flawed powers.
Russian disinformation in the Middle East operates through a multi-layered ecosystem, rather than a single centralized channel. This system is adaptive, decentralized, and designed to appear organic.
At the core of this ecosystem are Russian state-funded outlets broadcasting in regional languages, including RT Arabic, Sputnik Arabic, Sputnik Türkiye, and Sputnik Iran. These platforms serve as narrative anchors rather than simple news providers.
Their content typically avoids overt propaganda. Instead, it relies on:
This approach allows Russian messaging to appear balanced and analytical, even when it subtly advances Kremlin priorities.
A second layer consists of regional media outlets that, for ideological or political reasons, amplify Russian narratives. Channels such as Al Mayadeen or Press TV do not need to be controlled by Moscow — alignment of interests is sufficient.
This localization effect is crucial. Once Russian narratives are reproduced by regional actors, they are no longer perceived as foreign messaging. They become part of the local media discourse, significantly increasing their legitimacy and reach.
Social media platforms — especially Telegram, X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, and TikTok — play a decisive role in emotional amplification. These platforms are not primarily used to convey complex arguments, but to trigger affective responses.
Short videos, emotionally charged headlines, symbolic images, and simplified storylines dominate this space. Importantly, much of this content does not rely on outright falsehoods. Instead, disinformation operates through:
This makes Russian messaging particularly difficult to counter using traditional fact-checking tools.
Despite regional variations, Russian disinformation in the MENAT region consistently revolves around several core narrative axes.
One of the most persistent narratives portrays Russia as a pragmatic power capable of engaging with all sides of regional conflicts. In contrast to the West, Moscow is depicted as:
This framing has proven especially effective in relation to Syria and Libya, where Western intervention is often associated with long-term instability.
The United States, NATO, and the European Union are frequently framed as destabilizing actors driven by selective morality and geopolitical self-interest. Common accusations include:
Within this framework, Russia’s war against Ukraine is often relativized by comparing it to conflicts in the Middle East, thereby diluting Moscow’s responsibility.
A particularly noteworthy element of Russian messaging concerns Poland. In Russian-language media targeting Middle Eastern audiences, Poland is frequently portrayed as:
Crucially, Poland is rarely presented as an autonomous political actor. Instead, it functions as a symbolic extension of Western aggression, reinforcing broader anti-NATO narratives.
The effectiveness of Russian disinformation in the Middle East should not be measured by overt support for Moscow. Its success lies elsewhere — in changing how conflicts are interpreted, not necessarily in changing political loyalties.
Key long-term effects include:
From Moscow’s perspective, convincing audiences that “everyone is guilty” is often sufficient. Moral equivalence is a powerful strategic outcome.
Several conclusions emerge from the analysis:
Addressing Russian information operations in the Middle East requires a strategic shift.
First, systematic monitoring of Russian narratives in Arabic, Turkish, and Persian must become a permanent element of analytical and diplomatic practice.
Second, Western actors — including Poland — should move beyond reactive fact-checking and invest in proactive narrative engagement tailored to regional sensitivities.
Third, greater involvement of regional experts, journalists, and opinion leaders is essential to building credible counter-narratives.
Finally, disinformation should be treated as a security challenge, not merely a communication problem.
Russia’s information strategy in the Middle East demonstrates that influence in the 21st century is increasingly about shaping how people interpret reality rather than controlling what they know. As long as ambiguity benefits Moscow, the Kremlin will continue to invest in narratives that erode certainty, weaken alliances, and normalize disorder.
The conclusions were drawn on the basis of the debate: Russian disinformation in the Middle East.



